Open-source atomic malware analysis

Analyze another

e8fca6d589613ccb2d1341e2d144bf896d3f73956794dcb00a047d73750641b6

PE
Verdict: HOSTILE
AI Go loader with obfuscation and direct syscalls
Mal-ecule
O₂(As₂C)H(Os)Md₃(PtBiSi₃)
Size 2.5 MB download
First seen 3 days ago
Analyzed 1 day ago
Ecosystem windows
Source abuse.ch
Also detected by 1 source
Go PE with opaque identity and raw API dispatch: hjbk.exe:0x1a2c2c
Go PE with opaque build identity and dynamic API dispatch: hjbk.exe:0x1a2c2c
Go build path is opaque random: hjbk.exe
hjbk.exe pe
0x1a2bac 652e6e6577496e6c696e65556e77696e e.newInlineUnwin
0x1a2bbc 6465720073797363616c6c2e636f6d70 der.syscall.comp
0x1a2bcc 696c6543616c6c6261636b0072756e74 ileCallback.runt
0x1a2bdc 696d652e6362734c6f636b0072756e74 ime.cbsLock.runt
0x1a2bec 696d652e63616c6c6261636b61736d41 ime.callbackasmA
0x1a2bfc 6464720072756e74696d652e63627355 ddr.runtime.cbsU
0x1a2c0c 6e6c6f636b0073797363616c6c2e6c6f nlock.syscall.lo
0x1a2c1c 616473797374656d6c69627261727900 adsystemlibrary.
0x1a2c2c 73797363616c6c2e53797363616c6c4e syscall.SyscallNGo PE with opaque identity and raw API dispatch
0x1a2c3c 0073797363616c6c2e6c6f61646c6962 .syscall.loadlib
0x1a2c4c 726172790073797363616c6c2e676574 rary.syscall.get
0x1a2c5c 70726f63616464726573730073797363 procaddress.sysc
0x1a2c6c 616c6c2e53797363616c6c0073797363 all.Syscall.sysc
0x1a2c7c 616c6c2e53797363616c6c3600737973 all.Syscall6.sys
0x1a2c8c 63616c6c2e53797363616c6c39007469 call.Syscall9.ti
0x1a2c9c 6d652e72756e74696d654e6f77007469 me.runtimeNow.ti
0x1a2cac 6d652e72756e74696d654e616e6f0074 me.runtimeNano.t
0x1a2cbc 696d652e536c6565700074696d652e6e ime.Sleep.time.n
0x1a2ccc 657754696d65720074696d652e73746f ewTimer.time.sto
0x1a2cdc 7054696d65720072756e74696d652e77 pTimer.runtime.w
0x1a2cec 726974650072756e74696d652e747261 rite.runtime.tra
0x1a2cfc 6365416476616e63650072756e74696d ceAdvance.runtim
0x1a2d0c 652f74726163652e72756e74696d655f e/trace.runtime_
0x1a2d1c 7472616365436c6f636b556e69747350 traceClockUnitsP
0x1a2d2c 65725365636f6e640072756e74696d65 erSecond.runtime
0x1a2d3c 2e63616c6c65727300696e7465726e61 .callers.interna
0x1a2d4c 6c2f72756e74696d652f6d6170732e74 l/runtime/maps.t
0x1a2d5c 797065537472696e670072756e74696d ypeString.runtim
0x1a2d6c 652e6d6170696e69746e6f e.mapinitno
0x1a5a6c 6450726f630073797363616c6c2e4279 dProc.syscall.By
0x1a5a7c 746550747246726f6d537472696e6700 tePtrFromString.
0x1a5a8c 73797363616c6c2e282a50726f63292e syscall.(*Proc).
0x1a5a9c 43616c6c0073797363616c6c2e282a50 Call.syscall.(*P
0x1a5aac 726f63292e416464720073797363616c roc).Addr.syscal
0x1a5abc 6c2e282a4c617a79444c4c292e4c6f61 l.(*LazyDLL).Loa
0x1a5acc 640073797363616c6c2e282a4c617a79 d.syscall.(*Lazy
0x1a5adc 444c4c292e4c6f61642e646566657277 DLL).Load.deferw
0x1a5aec 726170310073797363616c6c2e282a4c rap1.syscall.(*LGo PE with opaque identity and raw API dispatch
0x1a5afc 617a7950726f63292e46696e64007379 azyProc).Find.sy
0x1a5b0c 7363616c6c2e282a4c617a7950726f63 scall.(*LazyProc
0x1a5b1c 292e46696e642e646566657277726170 ).Find.deferwrap
0x1a5b2c 310073797363616c6c2e282a4c617a79 1.syscall.(*Lazy
0x1a5b3c 50726f63292e43616c6c007379736361 Proc).Call.sysca
0x1a5b4c 6c6c2e282a4c617a7950726f63292e6d ll.(*LazyProc).m
0x1a5b5c 75737446696e640073797363616c6c2e ustFind.syscall.
0x1a5b6c 42797465536c69636546726f6d537472 ByteSliceFromStr
0x1a5b7c 696e670073797363616c6c2e55544631 ing.syscall.UTF1
0x1a5b8c 3646726f6d537472696e670073797363 6FromString.sysc
0x1a5b9c 616c6c2e5554463136546f537472696e all.UTF16ToStrin
0x1a5bac 670073797363616c6c2e4572726e6f2e g.syscall.Errno.
0x1a5bbc 4572726f720073796e63 Error.sync
0x1adb68 71737a6661736a6d636170636b707a63 qszfasjmcapckpzc
0x1adb78 7a7776006d61696e2e6d65636168707a zwv.main.mecahpz
0x1adb88 006d61696e2e74767a6e7974796f6a6f .main.tvznytyojo
0x1adb98 7a006d61696e2e617374706972737278 z.main.astpirsrx
0x1adba8 70677a680073797363616c6c2e282a4c pgzh.syscall.(*L
0x1adbb8 617a79444c4c292e4e657750726f6300 azyDLL).NewProc.
0x1adbc8 6d61696e2e59706c6465726864787077 main.YplderhdxpwGo types with concatenated-word obfuscation
0x1adbd8 6b6a796c627966006d61696e2e417169 kjylbyf.main.Aqi
0x1adbe8 6c006d61696e2e73746f7566006d6174 l.main.stouf.mat
0x1adbf8 682f72616e642e4e6577006d6174682f h/rand.New.math/
0x1adc08 72616e642e4e6577536f75726365006d rand.NewSource.m
0x1adc18 6174682f72616e642e6e6577536f7572 ath/rand.newSour
0x1adc28 6365006d6174682f72616e642e282a52 ce.math/rand.(*R
0x1adc38 616e64292e466c6f61743634006d6169 and).Float64.mai
0x1adc48 6e2e7a61756d676f69726f6474707768 n.zaumgoirodtpwh
0x1adc58 63746979626e006d61696e2e73677078 ctiybn.main.sgpx
0x1adc68 7200656e636f64696e672f6865782e45 r.encoding/hex.E
0x1adc78 6e636f6465546f537472696e6700656e ncodeToString.en
0x1adc88 636f64696e672f6865782e456e636f64 coding/hex.Encod
0x1adc98 65006d61696e2e e.main.
0x23a170 6000700080009000a000b000c000d000 `.p.............
0x23a180 e000f00000012001400160018001a001 ...... .@.`.....
0x23a190 c001e001000240028002c00200038003 ......@.........
0x23a1a0 00048004000580050006000700080009 ................
0x23a1b0 800a000c800c800d0010001300150018 ................
0x23a1c0 8019801a001b0020002500260028802a ....... .%.&.(.*
0x23a1d0 00300035003800400048804a00500055 .0.5.8.@.H.J.P.U
0x23a1e0 0060806a007000800000000000000000 .`.j.p..........
0x23a1f0 00000000000000000000000000000000 ................
0x23a200 0100000000000000532a889cdc06f345 ........S*.....E
0x23a210 81bb69eaa3af4ef883208778322bc5b6 ..i...N.. .x2+..
0x23a220 c38a77bd57c7a2fcc0a59b8474dc486e ..w.W.......t.Hn
0x23a230 3924a313d45d920c7d4e536239d63bfc 9$...]..}NSb9.;.
0x23a240 0989765dea6b04d182fcbe684de038d3 ..v].k.....hM.8.
0x23a250 e973a60673ac23737650f27b17bf0839 .s..s.#svP.{...9Go PE with opaque identity and raw API dispatch
0x23a260 1f300bbcff2ff13f3eda14b416235ede .0.../.?>....#^.
0x23a270 6e13964f9efd6cda5ad4bf3ccd7e8c9e n..O..l.Z..<.~..
0x23a280 f6e2cbd78f754fead425a514ef730e7a .....uO..%...s.z
0x23a290 10ba1a3f62bff6d757d7f6f88d6006ac ...?b...W....`..
0x23a2a0 01000000000000000a00000000000000 ................
0x23a2b0 6400000000000000e803000000000000 d...............
0x23a2c0 1027000000000000a086010000000000 .'..............
0x23a2d0 40420f00000000008096980000000000 @B..............
0x23a2e0 00e1f5050000000000ca9a3b00000000 ...........;....
0x23a2f0 00e40b540200000000e8764817000000 ...T......vH....
0x23a300 0010a5d4e800000000a0724e18090000 ..........rN....
0x23a310 00407a10f35a00000080c6a47e8d0300 .@z..Z......~...
0x23a320 0000c16ff286230000008a5d78456301 ...o..#....]xEc.
0x23a330 000064a7b3b6e00d0000e8890423c78a ..d..........#..
0x23a340 300039000100600669060100f006f906 0.9...`.i.......
0x23a350 0100c007c907010066096f09 ........f.o.
0x27d1df 746166697073656e6400676f3a6d6169 tafipsend.go:mai
0x27d1ef 6e2e696e69747461736b7300676f3a72 n.inittasks.go:r
0x27d1ff 756e74696d652e696e69747461736b73 untime.inittasks
0x27d20f 0072756e74696d652e6275696c645665 .runtime.buildVe
0x27d21f 7273696f6e2e7374720072756e74696d rsion.str.runtim
0x27d22f 652e6d6f64696e666f2e737472007275 e.modinfo.str.ru
0x27d23f 6e74696d652e747970656c696e6b0072 ntime.typelink.r
0x27d24f 756e74696d652e697461626c696e6b00 untime.itablink.
0x27d25f 676f3a6275696c64696e666f00676f3a go:buildinfo.go:Go PE with opaque build identity and dynamic API dispatch
0x27d26f 6275696c64696e666f2e726566007275 buildinfo.ref.ru
0x27d27f 6e74696d652e70636c6e746162007275 ntime.pclntab.ru
0x27d28f 6e74696d652e66696e6466756e637461 ntime.findfuncta
0x27d29f 620072756e74696d652e726f64617461 b.runtime.rodata
0x27d2af 0072756e74696d652e65726f64617461 .runtime.erodata
0x27d2bf 0072756e74696d652e74797065730072 .runtime.types.r
0x27d2cf 756e74696d652e657479706573007275 untime.etypes.ru
0x27d2df 6e74696d652e6e6f7074726461746100 ntime.noptrdata.
0x27d2ef 72756e74696d652e656e6f7074726461 runtime.enoptrda
0x27d2ff 74610072756e74696d652e6461746100 ta.runtime.data.
0x27d30f 72756e74696d652e6564617461007275 runtime.edata.ru
0x27d31f 6e74696d652e6273730072756e74696d ntime.bss.runtim
0x27d32f 652e656273730072756e74696d652e6e e.ebss.runtime.n
0x27d33f 6f7074726273730072756e74696d652e optrbss.runtime.
0x27d34f 656e6f7074726273730072756e74696d enoptrbss.runtim
0x27d35f 652e636f7663747273007275 e.covctrs.ru

Objectives

Micro-behaviors

Metadata

notable severity, 100% confident.
signed Authenticode chain CN: trust.me
notable severity, 100% confident.
signed/certificate PE leaf certificate is self-issued
baseline severity, 95% confident.
lang Go binary built with trimpath flag

Identity

SHA-256 e8fca6d589613ccb2d1341e2d144bf896d3f73956794dcb00a047d73750641b6
Filename hjbk.exe
Package e8fca6d589613ccb2d1341e2d144bf896d3f73956794dcb00a047d73750641b6

Origin

Source harvest
Feed malwarebazaar
Ecosystem windows
Domain abuse.ch

Timeline

First seen 23 Jul 2026 17:25 UTC
First analyzed 25 Jul 2026 21:52 UTC
Last analyzed 25 Jul 2026 21:52 UTC
Last updated 25 Jul 2026 21:52 UTC

Labeling

Label bad
Label source harvest
Traits version 9266e